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INTRODUCTION 
With the completion of every census comes a 
redistricting.1  Because redistricting will always have its 
winners and losers,2 allegations of bias are common.  One 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law, 2013.  I would 
like to thank Angelo Ancheta.  He made researching and writing this paper 
possible.  Further, I would like to thank the Editors and Associates of the Santa 
Clara Law Review for all of their hours of assistance.    
 1. Strength in Numbers, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf 
/StrengthInNumbers2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 
cl. 3; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–69 (1964). 
 2. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 129 (4th ed. 2008). 
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common allegation, if a political branch is in control of 
redistricting,3 is that the dominant party engaged in partisan 
gerrymandering.  In fact, there are allegations that 
Minnesota has fallen victim to partisan gerrymandering 
following the 2010 Census.4  The judiciary has proven 
incapable of agreeing on a standard for adjudicating this 
issue.5  In recent years, the Court has never been able to 
garner more than a plurality when faced with the issue of 
partisan gerrymandering, and several justices have written 
concurrences suggesting their own standards.6  Courts 
therefore currently lack a clearly defined standard dictating 
how to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims. 
Partisan gerrymandering claims raise several different 
issues that the Supreme Court has struggled with each time 
it has addressed the question.  First, does partisan 
gerrymandering actually violate the Constitution of the 
United States?7  Second, are partisan gerrymandering claims 
even justiciable?8  There are six issues that may prevent 
courts from having the power to address redistricting: (1) if it 
is found to be constitutionally dedicated to a nonjudicial 
branch of government, (2) if the Court can find no judicially 
discoverable or manageable standard to address the issue, (3) 
if there is no avenue for the Court to decide the case without 
making a policy determination within the purview of 
nonjudicial discretion, (4) if there is no way for the Court to 
make a decision without expressing a lack of respect to a 
coordinate branch of government, (5) if there is an unusual 
need for adherence to a political decision, or (6) if there is a 
 
 3. Some states have elected to place the job of redistricting in the hands of 
a group not related to the political process.  California is one of these states.  See 
generally STATE OF CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON 
2011 REDISTRICTING (2011), available at 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_082011/crc_2011081
5_2final_report.pdf [hereinafter REDISTRICTING COMM’N]. 
 4. Report shows heavy partisan gerrymander in proposed Minnesota Maps, 
MIDWESTDEMOCRACYNETWORK.org (May 13, 2011), http://www.midwest 
democracynetwork.org/index.php/reports/article/MN_partisan_gerrymander_rep
ort/.  
 5. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); 
Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 6. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 399; Cox, 542 U.S. at 
947; Veith, 541 U.S. at 267. 
 7. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 313–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 8. See id. at 271–306 (plurality opinion). 
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potential for embarrassment from different declarations by 
various branches of government.9  Moreover, even if partisan 
gerrymandering claims are both justiciable and present a 
constitutional violation, the Court must address the issue of 
the proper standard for such suits.10 
The first part of this Comment will discuss the 
background of the partisan gerrymander.11  This section will 
discuss the historical backdrop of the issue, how the Supreme 
Court previously handled partisan gerrymandering, and the 
more recent holdings of partisan gerrymandering cases.12  
The Comment will then state the legal problem, and then 
analyze the different proposed standards.13  Unfortunately, 
the paper will demonstrate that none of these proposed 
standards are workable; however, the Comment will conclude 
that partisan gerrymandering is indeed justiciable.  Finally, 
this Comment will propose a new standard for adjudicating 
partisan gerrymandering claims and will explain why this 
standard is appropriate for cases involving discrimination on 
the basis of political affiliation.14  For the purposes of this 
Comment, the first question the court must answer—whether 
a partisan gerrymander actually violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment—will largely be bracketed.  In their analysis, 
most of the justices seem to assume that if partisan 
gerrymandering is a justiciable issue, and if a redistricting 
scheme could satisfy the hypothetical partisan 
gerrymandering test, then an act of partisan gerrymandering 
would in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.15  Thus, this Comment will only 




 9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (finding these categories will 
deem an issue a nonjusticiable political question). 
 10. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part II–III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 
399 (2006); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
As long as legislatures have been in charge of 
redistricting, partisan gerrymandering has been a problem.  
Parties and individuals use it to make their election prospects 
brighter.  In the process, however, the ability of voters to 
effectively exercise their respective voices is suppressed. 
A. Defining Partisan Gerrymandering 
So what exactly is partisan gerrymandering?  In the 
United States, we base our representation system on 
geographic regions, where an individual represents a set area 
in a legislative body.16  Elections of representatives from 
these geographic regions are typically conducted on a winner-
take-all basis.17  Whoever receives the most votes wins the 
right to represent the region.18  “Since a separate winner-
take-all election occurs in each district, when the elections are 
run along party lines there is no assurance that the statewide 
vote for a given party will be proportionate to the number of 
legislative seats it wins.”19  In other words, a party receiving 
forty percent of the vote may very well win only thirty percent 
of the seats.20  Winner-take-all elections provide an 
opportunity to draw districts to favor a particular party.  For 
example, if there is a state with one hundred and fifty 
Democrats and one hundred and forty Republicans and three 
districts are to be drawn, it is theoretically possible to draw 
the districts so each one contains fifty Democrats, but two of 
them contain sixty Republicans and one contains only 
twenty.21  In this hypothetical, despite Democrats being the 
majority of the populace, Republicans would always have a 
majority in the legislature.  The redrawing of those districts, 




 16. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 247. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 129.  Of course a legislature must comply with the one-person, 
one-vote requirement set out in Reynolds v. Sims, but this does not preclude 
legislatures from gaming redistricting to their advantage.  See Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 539 (1964). 
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Of course, not every type of redistricting is an improper 
redistricting.22  Sometimes, legislatures adhere to traditional 
redistricting criteria.23  These requirements can include, but 
are not limited to: geographic contiguity, geographic 
compactness, preserving communities of interest, and 
nesting.24  The only redistricting requirement legislatures 
must adhere to under the Constitution is the “one person, one 
vote” requirement,25 though compliance with the above 
factors is considered normal and preferable.  Occasionally, 
however, legislatures use impermissible characteristics when 
redistricting, such as the race of the populace.26  “The term 
[partisan] gerrymandering is defined as ‘[t]he practice of 
dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of 
highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair 
advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.’ ” 27  
This is problematic because “[a] group that is denied by 
partisan gerrymandering the effective exercise of its vote is 
necessarily deprived of the ability to protect its rights.  
Because elected officials are free to disregard its needs and 
concerns, that group is denied an effective voice in policy 
making decisions.”28 
B. A History of the Practice and the Role of the Law 
The term gerrymandering arises from a redistricting 
scheme in 1812.29  Throughout American history, 
gerrymanders have been a common part of politics.  For 
instance, post-Reconstruction South Carolina Democrats 
 
 22. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586–87. 
 23. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 244. 
 24. REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). 
 27. Whitney M. Eaton, Where Do We Draw the Line?  Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the State of Texas, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2006).  
 28. Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially 
Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 
46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 244 (2009). 
 29. Id.  That year, the governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry, approved 
a redistricting plan which included a district shaped like a salamander.  Id.  
The purpose of this district was to advance Gerry’s political party.  Id.  The 
Federalist Press mocked the district as a “Gerrymander,” an obvious hybrid of 
the word salamander and the name Gerry.  Elbridge Gerry, 5th Vice President 
(1813–1814), UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory 
/history/common/generic/VP_Elbridge_Gerry.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
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drew districts to ensure there was only one majority 
Republican, and thus majority black, district.30 
Originally, claims regarding unfair redistricting were 
deemed nonjusticiable political questions.31  The Supreme 
Court regularly affirmed lower court decisions dismissing 
partisan gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable.32  This 
changed after Baker v. Carr, when gerrymandering claims 
were first accepted into the judicial purview.33 
The big shift in partisan gerrymandering came in 1986, 
when a majority of the Supreme Court announced in Davis v. 
Bandemer that partisan gerrymandering claims are in fact 
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34  A district court found that 
Indiana’s state apportionment plan favored Republicans, and 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.35  Though finding the partisan 
gerrymandering claim to be ultimately justiciable, the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s holding.36  In the 
process, the Court announced that to be successful, a plaintiff 
in a partisan gerrymandering case must show: (1) the 
defendants intentionally discriminated against their 
identifiable political group, and (2) a discriminatory effect on 
their group.37 
 
 30. McDonald, supra note 28, at 246. 
 31. Id.  
 32. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 2, 424 
U.S. 950 (1976), aff'g 68 F.R.D. 668 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Ferrell v. Hall, 406 U.S. 
939 (1972), aff'g 339 F.Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Wells v. Rockefeller, 398 
U.S. 901 (1970), aff'g 311 F.Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 
382 U.S. 4 (1965), aff’g 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).  These cases were 
abrogated by Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).  See discussion infra Part 
I.B. 
 33. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 34. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125. 
 35. McDonald, supra note 28, at 247 (holding the districts deprived 
Democrats of their representational rights, as evidenced by the irregular shapes 
of districts, the mix of single-member and multi-member districts, and the 
creation of new district lines that failed to adhere to political subdivision 
boundaries). 
 36. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125, 143. 
 37. Id. at 127; see also id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Though a majority of the justices did not sign on to the part 
of Justice White’s opinion where he announced the standard courts should abide 
by when adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice Powell 
specifically stated in his dissent that he agreed with the plurality that a 
plaintiff must show both intent and effect.  Id. 
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A plurality of the Court attempted to expand on the effect 
prong, stating that discriminatory effect can be shown via an 
electoral process that will consistently degrade the plaintiff’s 
influence on the political process, but these members were not 
able to garner a majority of the Court.38  The dissenting 
justices articulated their own standard, suggesting factors 
such as fairness, shape of the voting district, adherence to 
established political subdivisions, nature of the legislative 
procedures, and the legislative history should determine if an 
impermissible partisan gerrymander has occurred.39  The only 
standard the majority of the Court could agree on was the 
vague intent-effect standard, which became the law.40  
Finally, a concurrence held partisan gerrymandering claims 
should be nonjusticiable.41 
Unfortunately, Bandemer proved difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply.  One observer even noted that the 
standard essentially became “dead letter law.”42  In fact, there 
was only one instance where a court actually found a 
 
 38. See id. at 132 (plurality opinion).  The plurality expanded upon this 
definition, stating it would require the plaintiff to show he has been denied a 
chance to effectively influence the political process.  Id. at 132–33.  The 
plurality further opined that a history of lack of proportional representation 
alone would not be sufficient.  Id. 
 39. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
However, none of these factors would be dispositive.  Id. 
 40. See id. at 127 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 161 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); McDonald, supra note 28, at 247.  
Despite the fact that this was the only standard five Justices could agree on, 
many lower courts chose to adopt the plurality’s definition of what constitutes 
discriminatory intent.  See, e.g., O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 855 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002). 
 41. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 42. McDonald, supra note 28, at 248.  The cases applying Bandemer suggest 
McDonald is correct.  See O’Lear, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (adopting the 
Bandemer plurality’s stringent effect test and finding no equal protection 
violation accordingly); Holloway v. Hechler, 817 F. Supp. 617, 627–28 (S.D.W.V. 
1992) (finding the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate both the requisite levels of 
intent and effect necessary to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); 
Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (finding plaintiffs had 
failed to prove they had been shut out of the political process, and thus had 
failed to demonstrate effect under Bandemer); McDonald, supra note 28, at 249–
50 (citing Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1174–75 (W.D. Tex. 1993)) 
(noting the court rejected the partisan gerrymandering claim even though 
Republicans consistently garnered a majority of the vote yet always failed to 
attain a majority of the legislature). 
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cognizable unlawful partisan gerrymander under Bandemer.43  
Other than this one anomaly, Bandemer proved an 
inapplicable standard. 
C. The Modern State of the Law 
After the 2000 redistricting, partisan gerrymandering 
returned to the Supreme Court in three separate cases.44  The 
first case followed a Pennsylvania redistricting plan passed in 
2002.45  Though Democrats were a majority in the state, the 
plan created Republican majorities in sixty-eight percent of 
the state congressional districts.46  National Republican 
figures openly pushed the plan as a means to counter similar 
moves by Democrats elsewhere.47 
Eventually, the case reached the Supreme Court in Vieth 
v. Jubelirer.48  Unfortunately, the Court was unable to reach 
a majority, and several justices wrote concurrences and 
dissents, leaving the law in a confusing place.49  The plurality 
opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas, found 
partisan gerrymandering claims to be nonjusticiable political 
questions.50  Justice Scalia seemingly based his decision on 
the “lack of a judicially discoverable and manageable 
standard[]” test for a political question, as constructed in 
Baker v. Carr.51  First, Justice Scalia noted that since the 
Bandemer decision, no lower court had been able to shape a 
 
 43. McDonald, supra note 28, at 251–52.  In Republican Party of N.C. v. 
Martin, a court found a possible partisan gerrymandering claim where a 
Republican had not been elected to the Superior Court in over a hundred years.  
See id. (citing Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 948, 961 (4th 
Cir. 1992)). 
 44. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); 
Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 45. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 254. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  Despite this evidence, the district court dismissed the claim because 
although it was the intent of the plan to discriminate against Democrats, the 
plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite discriminatory effect as the Democrats 
had not been entirely shut out from the political process.  Id. (citing Vieth v. 
Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 547 (M.D. Pa. 2002)). 
 48. Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 49. See generally id. 
 50. See id. at 267, 306. 
 51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see generally Vieth, 541 U.S. 
267. 
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cognizable partisan gerrymandering scheme out of the intent-
effect framework set up by the Supreme Court.52  Second, he 
rejected every other proposed standard.53  He dismissed the 
litigant’s standard, which would have merely required 
plaintiffs to show that mapmakers acted with the 
predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage,54 because 
he said the term predominant was too hard to decipher and 
too ambiguous.55  He further dismissed the litigant’s effect 
test, which would have found partisan gerrymandering if 
plaintiffs showed that the districts systematically “packed 
and cracked” rival party’s voters.56  Justice Scalia claimed 
this would prove impossible, as a person’s politics was not 
nearly as discernible as a person’s race,57 and he further 
noted that proportional representation is not a requirement of 
the Constitution.58 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the 
litigants had failed to establish a claim,59 but not that 
partisan gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political 
question out of fear that one day someone would be successful 
in articulating a workable standard.60  He argued a category 
should only be deemed nonjusticiable if no standard could 
exist.61  He noted a claim could be made under the Fourteenth 
Amendment if a litigant could show how a permissible 
classification burdened his or her representational rights.62  
He further noted that a claim might be brought under the 
First Amendment, because a plaintiff could have an interest 
in his representational rights not being burdened because of 
his or her political ideology.63  Justice Scalia, however, was 
unconvinced, arguing that it is the Supreme Court’s job to 
find a standard.64 
 
 52. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 303. 
 53. See id. at 292–306. 
 54. Id. at 284. 
 55. Id. at 285. 
 56. Id. at 286. 
 57. Id. at 287. 
 58. Id. at 288. 
 59. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 312. 
 62. Id. at 313–14. 
 63. Id. at 314–15. 
 64. See id. at 301 (plurality opinion). 
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Justice Stevens disagreed with the plurality, and felt 
there was enough evidence to find an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander.65  He argued that since party 
affiliation has been found to be an impermissible criterion in 
employment decisions by public officials, it should also be an 
impermissible criterion for excluding voters from a 
congressional district.66  He proposed a standard that said if 
partisan considerations dominate, and no neutral justification 
can justify the districts, then the Equal Protection Clause 
would invalidate the districts.67 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg also dissented;68 they too 
felt it was time to articulate a new standard.69  To accomplish 
this task, they formulated a rebuttable five-part prima facie 
test that a plaintiff would need to establish.70  First, the 
plaintiff would need to prove he or she is a member of a 
cohesive political group.71  Second, he or she would have to 
show the district of his residence was not drawn with any 
heed to traditional districting criteria.72  Third, the plaintiff 
would need to show a specific correlation between the 
district’s deviations from the traditional redistricting criteria 
and the population distribution of his or her political group.73  
Fourth, the plaintiff would have to create an alternative 
district, which adheres closer to traditional districting 
criteria.74  Finally, the plaintiff would have to show that the 
defendant acted with the intent to harm the plaintiff’s 
group.75  Justice Scalia, however, rejected this test for failing 
to identify what minimal representation one could have 
 
 65. See id. at 339–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 324–25.  Stevens backed up his claims by noting a number of cases 
where the Supreme Court did in fact hold party affiliation to be an 
impermissible criterion, including: Bd. of Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 
674–75 (1996); O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–
17 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64–65 (1990); Branti v. 
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1980).  Id. 
 67. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 334–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. at 342–43. 
 69. See id. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 347. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 347–48. 
 73. Id. at 349. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 350. 
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before a partisan gerrymandering case would fail.76 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer opined that a partisan 
gerrymander violates the Fourteenth Amendment when there 
is an “unjustified use of political factors to entrench a 
minority in power.”77  He stated certain factors could include 
indicia of abuse such as middecennial redistricting, radical 
departures from traditional redistricting criteria, or a 
majority party twice failing to obtain a majority of seats 
without any neutral explanation.78  Justice Scalia was still 
unconvinced, as there could always be some neutral 
explanation.79 
The second case came to the Supreme Court a few 
months later.  In 2002, Democrats in Georgia redrew districts 
in order to stem the growing power of Republicans.80  The 
maps intentionally lead to underpopulated Democratic 
districts and overpopulated Republican districts.81  The 
district court ultimately found a violation of the “one person, 
one vote” constitutional requirement,82 and the Supreme 
Court ultimately affirmed on those grounds in Cox v. Larios.83  
However, Justice Stevens stated this was also an unlawful 
partisan gerrymander, stating that “the District Court’s 
detailed factual findings regarding appellees’ equal protection 
claim confirm that an impermissible partisan gerrymander is 
visible to the judicial eye and subject to judicially manageable 
standard[].”84 
Despite the inability of the Supreme Court to reach a 
cognizant, single standard in Vieth or Larios, the issue 
reached the Court again in League of United Latin American 
 
 76. Id. at 296–97 (plurality opinion). 
 77. Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 366. 
 79. Id. at 300 (plurality opinion). 
 80. McDonald, supra note 28, at 259.  The maps intentionally caused 
underpopulated Democratic districts and overpopulated Republican districts.  
Id.  The Court found that the districts were drawn to intentionally pair 
Republican incumbents against one another, forcing half the Republican caucus 
to run against a fellow republican incumbent.  See id. at 259–60. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1340, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 
542 U.S. 947 (2004); McDonald, supra note 28, at 260. 
 83. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 950 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.85  This case arose out of a 
middecennial redistricting plan from Texas.86  Previously, 
Democrats had drawn districts in a manner that placed 
Republicans at a disadvantage.87  However, as the 1990s 
pressed on, Republicans made significant gains in Texas.88  
When it came time to redistrict in 2000, the parties had split 
control over the Texas government, so no map could be agreed 
upon.89  This resulted in a court drawing the districts.90  
Eventually, the Republicans took complete control of the 
government, and redistricted middecade.91  The middecennial 
redistricting plan ultimately turned the already Republican 
controlled legislature into a supermajority of sixty-nine 
percent.92 
Though the case was dismissed by the district court, the 
case eventually reached the Supreme Court.93  Once again, 
the Supreme Court failed to reach a majority on the partisan 
gerrymandering claim.94  Justice Kennedy refused to discuss 
justiciability again;95 however, he dismissed the partisan 
gerrymandering claim because not every line was drawn with 
a partisan purpose.96  Further, he expressly rejected the 
plaintiffs’ suggested sole-intent standard, because he claimed 
it failed to require a plaintiff to show representational rights 
were actually burdened.97  He further rejected a standard 
based on symmetry, whereby partisan gerrymandering is 
determined by comparing the results of the election if the 
parties’ respective shares of the vote were reversed.98  He 
noted this standard was unsatisfactory because it failed to 
account for how much partisan dominance would be too 
 
 85. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 
399 (2006). 
 86. McDonald, supra note 28, at 256–57. 
 87. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 410–11. 
 88. Id. at 411. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. McDonald, supra note 28, at 256. 
 92. Id. at 256–57. 
 93. Id. at 257. 
 94. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. 399. 
 95. Id. at 414. 
 96. Id. at 417–19. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 420. 
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much.99 
Justice Stevens decided to change course from Vieth and 
reformulate his proposed standard.100  First, a plaintiff must 
show he or she is a resident within a redistricting map.101  
Then, he or she must demonstrate the predominant purpose 
of the plan was to maximize one party’s power.102  Finally, the 
plaintiff will need to demonstrate discriminatory effect.103  If 
the plaintiff meets all of these elements, he has established a 
partisan gerrymandering claim.104  The Justice expanded on 
the effect prong, stating effect could be shown if: the 
plaintiff’s candidate would have originally won under the 
preexisting plan, the plaintiff’s residence is now a safe district 
for the opposite party, and the new district is less compact 
than the old one.105  Justice Stevens ultimately concluded that 
the plaintiffs met this burden.106  Justice Breyer joined him, 
holding partisan gerrymandering claims to be justiciable, and 
reaffirming his previous holding that an unjustified use of 
purely partisan line drawing violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.107 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg once again adhered to the 
idea that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but 
merely disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s rejection of using 
the process followed in redistricting and his rejection of the 
use of symmetry as tools for adjudicating such claims.108 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito refused to rule on 
the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, noting 
that this issue was not argued.109  However, this fact did not 
stop Justices Scalia and Thomas from reiterating their belief 
that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable 
political questions.110 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 475–76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 101. Id. at 475. 
 102. Id. at 475–76. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 476. 
 106. Id. at 482. 
 107. See id. at 491–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 108. Id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 109. Id. at 492–93 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 110. Id. at 511–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
Due to the lack of a majority in the recent partisan 
gerrymandering cases,111 lower courts have no single 
identifiable standard to use when adjudicating partisan 
gerrymandering claims.  Lower courts may not even be sure if 
such partisan claims are justiciable.  This could result in a 
partisan gerrymandering claim in one district court being 
dismissed as a political question, and another claim in a 
different court succeeding under one of the many articulated 
standards or even the previously stated Bandemer standard.  
In order for our judicial system to maintain consistency, there 
is a need for a uniform standard that all federal courts can 
rely upon. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Comment will analyze the proposed standards one 
at a time, organized by the proponent of those standards. 
A. Justices Scalia and Thomas 
Close examination of the case law suggests Justices 
Scalia and Thomas are wrong, and partisan gerrymandering 
is justiciable.  In Baker v. Carr, the Court noted an issue is a 
political question if any of the following six classifications 
applies: 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; 
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.112 
 
 
 111. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. 399; Cox v. 
Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  
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In Vieth, Justice Scalia argued partisan gerrymandering 
was a political question based on the second test.113  He 
focused mainly on the failure of courts to formulate a 
standard.114  This argument is flawed.  First, Justice Scalia 
argued that in the eighteen years Bandemer had been on the 
books, the lower courts failed to articulate a workable 
standard.115  However, as Justice Kennedy noted in his 
concurrence, the lower courts were bound by Bandemer.116  
Just because courts could not articulate a test using the 
Bandemer standard does not mean that one could never 
exist.117 
Next, Justice Scalia argued that demonstrating 
discriminatory effect was overly difficult.118  While he does 
correctly note that a mere failure to achieve a proportional 
representation would not suffice to demonstrate effect, he 
incorrectly suggests that requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that he or she was denied an effective opportunity to 
influence the political process is prohibitively difficult.119  As 
Justice Kennedy pointed out, new technologies such as 
computers can make it easier to determine the burden 
gerrymandering imposes.120  Further, courts have proven 
themselves capable of employing experts to determine the 
effects of partisan gerrymandering.121  Finally, Bandemer 
bound all the cases Justice Scalia uses to back up his 
argument.122  Lower courts cannot determine what constitutes 
effect when the Supreme Court offered no guidance as to 
when a plaintiff might rightly believe that he or she was 
denied an ability to effectively influence the political process. 
Justice Scalia further argued that even the litigant’s 
suggested effects prong was unworkable.123  The litigants 
suggested that effect can be shown if “the plaintiffs show that 
 
 113. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278. 
 114. Id. at 279. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 117. See id. at 281–84 (plurality opinion). 
 118. See id. at 286–87. 
 119. See id. at  281. 
 120. Id. at 312–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 121. See, e.g., Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 655–59 
(N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 122. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 282–83. 
 123. See id. at 286. 
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the districts systematically ‘pack’ and ‘crack’ the rival party’s 
voters, and . . . the court’s examination of the ‘totality of 
circumstances’ confirms that the map can thwart the 
plaintiffs’ ability to translate a majority of votes into a 
majority of seats.”124  Justice Scalia argued that this would be 
an unfeasible standard, because political disposition is not as 
discernible as race, and is not immutable.125  But the number 
of registered members of a party within a district is not 
difficult to discern.126  Further, the mutability of political 
preferences should not preclude creating an effects prong, 
because voters’ ability to change location has never prevented 
the Court from announcing gerrymandering standards in 
other contexts.127  It is true that people cannot step out of 
their race, nor can they stop existing; however, the Court had 
no problem mandating that the standard for United States 
congressional districts must be one person, one vote, even 
though populations will not stay the same over the course of 
the decade.128 
Justice Scalia also argued the intent standard was too 
hard to prove.129  He did this by claiming the appellant’s 
proposed intent standard—which required a predominant 
intent to disadvantage the plaintiff’s group as opposed to the 
Bandemer standard of merely showing intent to 
disadvantage—would be too hard to show on a statewide 
basis.130  Racial equal protection cases, however, demonstrate 
 
 124. Id. at 286–87 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 125. Id. at 286. 
 126. For example, the California Secretary of State keeps statistics on party 
registration by United States Congressional District, Assembly District, and 
State Senate Districts.  See February 10, 2011—Report of Registration, 
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN (2013) [hereinafter Report of 
Registration], http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-11/.  In 
February 2011, State Senate District 10 was 50.85% Democrat, 19.23% 
Republican, 2.09% American Independent, and 0.51% Green.  Report of 
Registration as of February 10, 2011: Registration by State Senate District 
(2011), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-11/senate.pdf. 
 127. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 569 (1964); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960). 
 128. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 569. 
 129. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284. 
 130. Id. at 285 (noting that there would be too many questions as to how 
much intent would constitute too much intent, as at least some districts would 
be drawn for neutral purposes). 
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that it is only difficult, not impossible.131  This fact will be 
discussed in greater detail in the proposal section of this 
Comment.132  Justice Scalia then continued his argument by 
noting that even on a district-by-district basis, an intent 
standard is not viable because while racial discrimination is 
constitutionally proscribed, the partisan consequences of 
redistricting are not.133  His argument is that no consideration 
of racial factors is ever constitutionally permitted while some 
consideration of partisan factors is; and because redistricting 
is a political process, it would be impossible for courts to 
accurately ascertain when partisan considerations have 
become predominant.134  While Justice Scalia is correct that 
the Supreme Court has long acknowledged that political 
groups will unquestionably be disadvantaged by the 
redistricting process, the Supreme Court has also held that 
pure animus is never a legitimate government interest for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.135  Even if one could 
fairly argue that predominant consideration of partisan 
factors is not pure animus, the courts have a long history of 
adjudicating political issues under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court announced 
the one person, one vote standard, requiring districts be 
apportioned evenly based on the population.136  Admittedly, 
this case is not entirely on point, but it provides some integral 
clues as to whether it would be acceptable for a state to 
conduct a blatant partisan gerrymander.  The Court stated it 
was particularly concerned with clever ways to debase the 
vote of an individual as well as blatant, less ingenious 
methods.137  When a party engages in a successful partisan 
gerrymander, the party effectively rigs the process of 
elections to prevent certain political persuasions from 
 
 131. See generally Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977). 
 132. See infra Part IV. 
 133. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285–86. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (stating 
that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest”) (emphasis omitted). 
 136. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563–64 (1964). 
 137. See id. at 562–65.  
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garnering their supporters to affect the results of elections.138  
Because voting is the quintessential method of protecting 
rights,139 a partisan gerrymander is a form of preventing 
minority political persuasions from being able to actively 
protect their rights—it is a method of preventing people from 
being able to effectively exercise their vote, just like in 
Reynolds.140  Further, permissible partisan considerations will 
only make it more difficult to recognize an impermissible 
partisan gerrymander; it will not make it impossible like 
Justice Scalia asserts.141  Thus, even though there is no 
constitutional amendment expressly prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of political affiliation, and even if 
partisan considerations are occasionally constitutionally 
permissible, a redistricting scheme drawn with the main 
intent to disadvantage a political minority would not be 
invisible to the Constitution.142 
Though Justice Scalia may have been wrong regarding 
whether a judicially manageable standard existed, this does 
not rule out the possibility that partisan gerrymandering 
claims might be nonjusticiable.  There is a plausible 
argument that the Constitution textually commits 
redistricting to another branch—the legislature.143  Article I, 
Section 5 of the Constitution states that each congressional 
house shall be the judge of its election.144  In Powell v. 
McCormack, however, the Court set forth the boundaries that 
 
 138. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 244. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. 
 141. See infra Part IV. 
 142. The argument being that a partisan gerrymander would be tantamount 
to a legislature acting with the bare desire to harm the opposing political party 
in violation of the Constitution, or that once again, a clever way of rigging the 
election process to thwart various groups’ voting ability would also be violative 
of the Constitution.  After all, partisan gerrymandering cases are rife with 
examples of legislators not being so coy about their reasons for drawing districts 
in the fashion they did.  See McDonald, supra note 28, at 254.  But, once again, 
this Comment is not meant to address whether or not partisan gerrymanders in 
general violate the Constitution, as the Supreme Court has rarely touched on 
this question. 
 143. Joann D. Kamuf, Note, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”: The Current 
State of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal for the Future, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 198 (2005). 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
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Congress must abide by when judging their own elections.145  
If the Supreme Court can intervene when the legislature 
starts enforcing non-enumerated requirements on their 
members, surely they can intervene when a legislature 
redistricts to disadvantage a political party. 
Next, one might argue that Article I, Section 4 leaves the 
time, place, and manner regulations of elections to the 
purview of state legislatures and only grants Congress power 
to intervene.146  Case law, however, suggests the contrary.  
Per Wesberry v. Sanders, judicial intervention is appropriate 
if a state legislature redistricts for the purpose of debasing 
voting power.147  Further, legislatures may make procedural, 
not outcome-determinative, regulations regarding elections;148 
and a partisan gerrymander would qualify as an outcome-
determinative regulation.149 
Further, the Tenth Amendment has never barred judicial 
intervention.  As Reynolds and Baker demonstrate, the 
Supreme Court has intervened whenever a state redistricts 
unconstitutionally.150  Though partisan gerrymandering is not 
a race-based claim like the issues in contention in those three 
cases, judicial intervention would still be based on 
constitutional grounds.151 
The other parts of the justiciability test seem to be less of 
a bar.  There is no need for the Court to make a policy 
 
 145. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969) (holding that 
Congress is only allowed to judge whether a member has met the requirement 
expressly stated in the Constitution, and that it is not allowed to have 
discretionary power to deny membership by a majority vote). 
 146. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; Kamuf, supra note 143, at 198. 
 147. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 148. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–33 (1995). 
 149. For instance, a legislature may mandate that all elections be mail=in 
elections, as this theoretically will not affect the outcome of the election; 
however, a legislature may not edit the ballot so one candidate’s name bears a 
type of scarlet letter that may dissuade voters from voting for him.  See id.  A 
partisan gerrymander would be outcome-determinative because the legislature 
would be making a decision that would likely affect the ability of certain 
candidates to get elected. 
 150. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 569 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 217 (1962). 
 151. Once again, whether or not partisan gerrymandering violates the Equal 
Protection Clause is not really an emphasis of this Comment.  The argument, 
however, would be that drawing districts so as to dilute someone’s vote on the 
basis of their political philosophy is denying them equal protection under the 
law. 
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determination when adjudicating a gerrymandering claim.  
Courts have previously invalidated districting schemes 
without doing so.152  Holding a districting scheme 
unconstitutional has never been found disrespectful towards 
a different branch of government.153  Courts would not be 
required to adhere to a political decision when adjudicating 
partisan gerrymandering claims.154  Finally, there is no great 
risk of embarrassment when adjudicating partisan 
gerrymandering claims.155  Thus, partisan gerrymandering 
claims do not appear to be a nonjusticiable political question, 
and the holdings of Justices Scalia and Thomas appear to be 
more result oriented than logically supportable. 
B. Justice Kennedy 
In Vieth, Justice Kennedy felt the plaintiff’s claim should 
be dismissed;156 however, he did not want to deem partisan 
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable.157  Justice Kennedy 
predicted that a time would come when someone would 
successfully articulate a partisan gerrymandering 
standard.158  He did not want to preclude future plaintiffs 
from using the judicial system as a means of remedying this 
real harm,159 but as Justice Scalia noted, he believed the 
Supreme Court should be in charge of articulating a standard 
for lower courts to follow.160 
 
 152. For instance, courts have invalidated redistricting schemes without 
making the policy determination of which constitutional redistricting criteria 
should have been relied upon.  See generally Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960). 
 153. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Baker, 369 U.S. 186. 
 154. This would merely be interpreting the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Cf. N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enters., Inc., 954 F.2d 847, 
852 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 155. Cases are typically only thrown out on "embarrassment" grounds when 
a judicial ruling acts as second guessing decisions of other branches.  See 
Harvard Law Review Association, The Political Question Doctrine, Executive 
Deference, and Foreign Relations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99; see also 
Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the judiciary could not rule in favor of plaintiffs suing Caterpillar Inc. for selling 
bulldozers to Israel in violation of international law, because doing so would 
implicitly question the policy of the United States to finance those sales).   
 156. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion). 
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Justice Kennedy also suggested that partisan 
gerrymandering claims could be brought under the First 
Amendment; suggesting that a partisan gerrymander is 
tantamount to penalizing a citizen for voicing a political view 
by deflating the strength of that citizen’s vote.161  The First 
Amendment, after all, has been used to prevent 
discrimination against political parties before.162  The idea 
that the First Amendment could be used to adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims was not only consistent with 
this other First Amendment jurisprudence, but it was a 
theory shared by others.163  As Justice Scalia correctly points 
out, however, finding a partisan gerrymander to be a 
violation of First Amendment would subject all political 
consideration in redistricting to judicial scrutiny.164  “What 
cases such as Elrod v. Burns . . . require is not merely that 
Republicans be given a decent share of the jobs in a 
Democratic administration, but that political affiliation be 
disregarded.”165  And as the Supreme Court had previously 
noted, political considerations can be allowed in some 
circumstances,166 so construing political gerrymandering as 
contrary to the First Amendment would conflict with 
established Supreme Court precedent. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in LULAC was no more 
illuminating.  While making a strong argument that the 
plaintiff’s sole intent standard was untenable,167 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion again failed to articulate any standard for 
courts to follow.168  As the post-Bandemer cases show us, the 
 
 161. Id. at 314–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 162. The First Amendment has been used by courts to limit the power of 
state legislators to prevent people from participating in an election because of 
their political disposition.  See Kamuf, supra note 143, at 206–08.  It has been 
used to curtail the power of legislatures to regulate the political parties’ 
contributions to the election process.  See id. at 204–05.  Courts have used it to 
prevent legislatures from requiring one party’s candidate to declare candidacy 
earlier than others.  See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1983).  
And courts have used it to prevent officials from basing employment decisions 
on partisan affiliation.  See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976). 
 163. See generally Kamuf, supra note 143, at 205–10. 
 164. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 294. 
 165. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 166. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 739–40 (1983). 
 167. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417–20 
(2006). 
 168. See id. 
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lower courts need clear guidance when adjudicating partisan 
gerrymandering claims.169 
C. Justice Stevens 
Justice Stevens’ Vieth opinion only focused on intent.  
Justice Stevens’ test would not require a plaintiff to show he 
was actually harmed by the partisan gerrymander.170  Though 
the scenario is unlikely, this could potentially lead to a case 
where a plaintiff could win a partisan gerrymandering claim 
without having to show the redistricting has a harmful effect. 
There is a more serious problem with Justice Stevens’ 
standard.  By requiring the plaintiff to show that 
partisanship was the sole motivation,171 Justice Stevens 
makes partisan gerrymandering impossible to prove.  A 
legislature will always be able to formulate some type of 
pretense for a redistricting scheme.172  The possibility that a 
legislature would redistrict with a partisan goal in mind and 
then fail to articulate any other reason for that goal is 
farfetched, even according to Stevens.173 
Justice Stevens’ LULAC opinion seems to recognize this 
failure.  In this opinion, Justice Stevens changed the intent 
standard to just a predominant motive.174  This is the 
appropriate level of intent a plaintiff should be required to 
prove.  As Justice Scalia noted, some consideration of 
partisan factors is inevitable,175 so a standard that only 
required any intent would be too broad; but a sole intent 
standard would prove impossible to meet.  However, where 
the Justice Stevens LULAC opinion fails is in its discussion of 
effect.  While Justice Stevens does in fact add an effect aspect 
to the test,176 he highlights effect in a manner that makes the 
 
 169. The fact that only one court was able to find a valid partisan 
gerrymandering claim suggests a cognizable standard is necessary.  McDonald, 
supra note 28, at 251–52. 
 170. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 334–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 255. 
 173. Id. (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 174. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 474 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 175. In some cases it can even be incredibly blatant.  See Karcher v. Daggett, 
462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983). 
 176. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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standard irrelevant.  Justice Stevens argued that to show 
effect, a plaintiff would need to show his or her candidate 
would have won under the preexisting plan, the new place of 
residence is now safe for the opposition, and the new district 
is less compact than the old district.177  This does little more 
than suggest that once a redistricting scheme causes some 
harm to someone, the effect element is met.178  The effect test 
needs to be more detailed as evidenced by the post-Bandemer 
lower court cases.179  The part of the Bandemer standard that 
failed was the effect prong.180  Thus, any feasible standard 
must adequately articulate effect. 
D. Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, came close to 
articulating a workable standard.  The first four parts of the 
Souter-Ginsburg test list several factors which would show 
evidence of intent:181 showing a plaintiff is a member of a 
cohesive group, showing a lack of heed to traditional 
redistricting principles, showing correlation between 
departures from traditional principles and the population of 
the plaintiffs’ group, and showing an alternative, traditional 
plan could be drawn.182  Though helpful, these four tests fail 
to articulate what type of harm must be shown.183  While 
these factors go a long way towards showing intent, they do 
not really demonstrate that a plaintiff was actually harmed.  
For instance, in Louisiana less than twenty-seven percent of 
the electorate is Republican, yet there is a Republican 
governor, and a Republican controlled legislature,184 which 
 
 177. Id. at 476 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 178. See id. 
 179. See O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 859 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding 
the plaintiffs failed to show effect because nothing was alleged beyond severely 
disproportionate results); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C. 1992); 
see also Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1174–75 (W.D. Texas 1993) 
(holding effect was not met because the burdened party still had an influence on 
legislative outcomes). 
 180. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 248–49. 
 181. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 346 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 182. Id. at 347–50. 
 183. See id. 
 184. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Democrats Now Make Up Less Than 50 Percent of 
Louisiana Voters, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUSINESS, (Aug. 15, 2011, 8:47 AM) 
http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/blog/2011/08/15/louisianas-democratic-
WEISS FINAL 7/23/2013  9:31 PM 
716 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
suggests many Democrats in the state are very willing to vote 
for Republican candidates.  If Republicans in that state 
redistrict so that they win a few more seats, it would not 
really be fair to say Democrats were harmed just because 
Democrats who already voted Republican are now in a 
district with more registered Republicans. 
As the fifth and final element of their partisan 
gerrymandering prima facie, Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
would require that the plaintiff prove the defendant acted 
intentionally to dilute the plaintiff political group’s voting 
strength.185  Unfortunately, here again the Souter-Ginsburg 
test does not sufficiently explain effect.  There is no 
suggestion as to how much voting strength must be diluted, 
or in what way it must be diluted, before harm has been 
demonstrated.186  Further, by making intent the focus of this 
element, it takes the focus off the harm aspect of the element.  
This element also seems to suggest that the plaintiffs need to 
show intent independent of the above variables, without 
articulating how. 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg argued that they did not 
need to articulate a standard in LULAC because the plan was 
plainly lawful.187  However, by stating they would not reject 
the amici’s proposed standard of symmetry, they suggested a 
willingness to consider a test including a consideration of how 
the parties would fare should their respective shares of the 
vote be reversed.188  As Justice Kennedy noted, however, this 
fails to take into account cross party voters and does not fully 
articulate how much partisan dominance is too much.189  
Therefore, without more, this element could prove again to be 
nonilluminating in a partisan gerrymandering case. 
E. Justice Breyer 
Justice Breyer’s Vieth standard finds a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment if there were an “unjustified use of 
 
resgistration-drops-below-50-percent/. 
 185. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 186. See id. at 296 (plurality opinion). 
 187. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 483 
(2006) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., opinion). 
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political factors to entrench a minority in power,”190 but is too 
vague to really be a workable standard.  Justice Breyer did 
attempt to curtail this problem by listing the neutral factors 
that a court could consider,191 but unfortunately, these factors 
provide little help.  Redistricting taking place more than once 
in a decade may suggest there was an unjustified use of 
political power192: but, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s 
near unanimous rejection of this as dispositive evidence in 
LULAC, this would not be enough to show a partisan 
gerrymander.193  The minority party gaining a majority of the 
seats could be the result of crossover voting.194  To be fair, 
Justice Breyer did note that if the failure of a majority party 
to obtain a majority of the seats could be explained by a 
neutral justification, it should not be considered as evidence 
of an unlawful partisan gerrymander.195  However, sometimes 
a neutral explanation may not be so apparent, so an adequate 
test should look to raw data to ensure party members are 
truly voting along party lines before stating that a party has 
truly been harmed.  Further, it is unlikely that any plan 
could not be justified or explained by anything other than an 
effort to secure partisan political advantage,196 because just as 
was the problem with Justice Stevens’ Vieth holding, it would 
not be difficult for a legislature to articulate some neutral 
explanation for its redistricting scheme.197 
IV. PROPOSAL 
An ideal test would require a partisan gerrymandering 
plaintiff to show intent and effect, but it should set a 
standard for courts to follow when attempting to ascertain 
these criteria.  To accomplish this, the ideal partisan 
gerrymandering test should use the Arlington Heights model 
for ascertaining intent, and it should modify the Gingles test 
 
 190. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 191. Id. at 366. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 
399 (2006). 
 194. An example of crossover voting can be seen in the Louisiana voting 
patterns mentioned earlier.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 184. 
 195. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 366 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 196. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 255. 
 197. See id. 
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for ascertaining effect. 
A. Non-suspect Class and Why the Modified Gingles Test is 
Appropriate 
Before discussing the applicable test, it is important to 
note that partisan affiliation will remain a non-suspect class, 
and thus this test will fall under rational basis scrutiny.  
Making political parties a suspect class and making all 
classifications based on political parties subject to strict or 
intermediate scrutiny could result in a myriad of lawsuits 
over issues within the permissible area of political 
jockeying.198  Non-suspect classes are adjudicated under the 
rational basis test, which asks whether the legislation is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.199  Animus, 
however, is never a legitimate state interest,200 and so a 
review of political gerrymandering on a rational basis 
platform should prove workable.  This ideal partisan 
gerrymandering test will determine whether there could be a 
reason other than animus by first determining whether the 
legislature acted with the intent to dilute the opposing party’s 
vote, and then determining whether the legislature actually 
did dilute the opposing party’s vote.  If there was no intent, 
then the motivation could not have been pure animus.  
Because this intent test will examine whether the legislature 
considered traditional redistricting criteria,201 if a plaintiff 
demonstrates intent, he likely could have demonstrated that 
alternative motives for the redistricting scheme were not 
really factors.  Also, if effect cannot be shown, it is equally 
unlikely animus was the purpose. 
Naturally, pure animus will be impossible to prove to an 
absolute certainty, as once again, a pretextual motive could 
always be conjured up for a redistricting scheme.202  The 
suggested test, however, will analyze whether the evidence of 
 
 198. See Benjamin D. Black, Developments in the State Regulation of Major 
and Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 110 (1996) (“Despite the 
vaunted position of political parties in political theory, politicians in state 
legislatures often interfere in the parties’ operation and constrain their political 
activities.”). 
 199. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). 
 200. See id. at 535. 
 201. See infra Part IV.B. 
 202. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 255. 
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animus is strong enough to warrant judicial intervention.  
That being said, it is still important to note why it is 
appropriate to use a test designed for rooting out racial 
discrimination in a claim of discrimination against a non-
suspect class.  After all, abridging the right to vote based on 
race is expressly prohibited203 and intentional racial 
discrimination is afforded suspect status under the 
Constitution.204  An individual generally cannot pretend to 
not be part of a race.  Also, racial discrimination has 
historically been much more prevalent and intense than 
political discrimination, and very rarely are there legitimate 
reasons to discriminate based on race.205  Though these 
differences are not insubstantial and should be accounted for, 
the effects of partisan gerrymandering are harmful enough to 
warrant borrowing the test.  When a party engages in a 
partisan gerrymander, as stated earlier, voters lose faith in 
the process, elected officials become free to disregard the 
concerns of a portion of the community they are supposed to 
represent, and the voters have no ability to protect their 
fundamental rights.206  In essence, partisan gerrymandering 
degrades the ability of elections to serve some of its most vital 
purposes.  After all, the Supreme Court has even described 
the right to vote as “ ‘ preservative of all rights.’ ” 207  In his 
book, Democracy and Distrust, John Ely argues that the 
United States Constitution is concerned about the process 
under which government operates, as opposed to the 
substantive policies of the government.208  Thus, it is 
important for the courts to intervene when the process of 
voting is manipulated so that those in power will remain in 
power, and those out of power will stay out.209  If everyone’s 
interests are effectively voiced in the process of voting, then 
those running for office cannot completely disregard any 
 
 203. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 204. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995). 
 205. Political affiliation, however, often does have a place in the political 
field.  Once again, there are many permissible classifications based on political 
party.  See Black, supra note 198, at 110. 
 206. McDonald, supra note 28, at 244. 
 207. Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
 208. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 101 (1980). 
 209. See id. at 103. 
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group; but if the system is manipulated by those in power, 
then those out of power lose any ability to effectively protect 
their rights.210  Ely even noted that pre-Revolution, the 
colonialists were concerned about lack of representation in 
Parliament in that: “(1) their input into the process by which 
they were governed was insufficient, and that (partly as a 
consequence) (2) they were being denied what others were 
receiving.”211  Thus, manipulation of the voting process is 
serious enough to warrant the use of a racial discrimination 
test. 
Further, voting has previously triggered stricter tests for 
discrimination, even when a non-suspect class is involved.  
Complete denial of the right to vote under the Equal 
Protection Clause triggers strict scrutiny for categories 
bearing no relation to voting qualifications,212 demonstrating 
the importance of this right.  This is why poll taxes receive 
strict scrutiny,213 even though the discrimination is based on 
wealth—a category that typically receives only rational basis 
scrutiny.214  Even when the burden on voting is deemed 
insubstantial, the Court still considers voting important 
enough to at least entertain a balancing test—balancing the 
interest of the state versus the burden on voting—all while 
claiming to be in the realm of rational basis scrutiny.215  
Further, even though this test will not eliminate all possible 
alternative motives besides animus, the Court has seemingly 
relaxed the rational basis test when dealing with a non-
suspect class that has been more often subjected to 
discrimination;216 and here too, political majorities often 
attempt to subvert political minorities.  Therefore, given the 
importance of fair voting procedures and the large temptation 
of major political parties to manipulate them, the Court will 
likely be willing to allow for a little more ambiguity than it 
typically does under the rational basis standard. 
 
 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. at 89. 
 212. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 213. See id. at 670. 
 214. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980).  
 215. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008). 
 216. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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All this being considered, however, the test still 
sufficiently accounts for the fact that racial discrimination 
should be easier to prove.  When a plaintiff establishes 
intentional discrimination based on a racial classification, he 
or she will win so long as the government cannot establish a 
compelling interest, which the law is narrowly tailored to 
meet, and so long as there is any discriminatory effect.217  In a 
Voting Rights Act adjudication, a plaintiff will win a racial 
gerrymander claim on Section Two grounds if he shows the 
requisite level of effect required under Thornburg v. Gingles, 
regardless of whether he can prove that the legislators had 
the intent to racially gerrymander.218  Thus, by requiring the 
plaintiff to show both intent and the heightened effect as 
required under the modified Gingles test, the bar will be 
significantly higher for most partisan gerrymandering 
plaintiffs.  As stated above, the purpose of requiring both 
tests is to eliminate any possible motive other than pure 
animus.  Therefore, this test should fit within the rational 
basis framework, without making political affiliation a de 
facto suspect class. 
B. Establishing Intent 
The ideal partisan gerrymandering test would require 
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant acted with the 
intent to dilute the opposition’s influence.  Intent is not part 
of the original Gingles Section Two of the Voting Rights Act 
test.219  However, intent will be a necessary element for two 
reasons.  First, intent is a common requirement in Equal 
 
 217. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268–69 (2003); Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (holding there was no Equal Protection 
Clause violation when a city council closed a public pool with discriminatory 
intent, but the effect was equal on both African American and white citizens). 
 218. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35–36, 50–51 (1986).  Though 
this will be described in further detail later in this section, a Voting Rights Act 
plaintiff cannot merely point to a minority neighborhood that has been drawn 
into a separate district; he must actually show that the minority vote is being 
cancelled out when a majority-minority district is possible, and he must show 
there are possible alternatives. See discussion infra Part IV.B–C; see Gingles, 
478 U.S. at 50-51 (noting that a Section 2 claim requires the racial group be 
sufficiently large and geographically compact, and it requires evidence of racial 
bloc voting). 
 219. See generally Gingles, 478 U.S. 30. 
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Protection jurisprudence.220  Second, partisan effect may be 
too easy to show on its own, because any time a legislature 
redistricts, one party will be harmed.221  Plaintiffs will not be 
required to show that intent based on partisan discrimination 
was the sole motivation, nor will the plaintiffs be allowed to 
meet the burden by showing intent was a motivation; because 
as mentioned before, these two standards would be impossible 
to meet or impossible to defeat respectively.222  Therefore, as 
suggested by Justice Stevens in his LULAC concurrence, 
plaintiffs should be required to show predominant intent.223  
To show a predominant intent to partisan gerrymander, the 
courts should borrow and modify the test used in racial equal 
protection claims—the Arlington Heights test.224  While not 
every possible Arlington Heights test will be applicable, the 
test should still help give the courts a clear idea of when there 
is enough evidence of intent. 
When determining intent, the Arlington Heights test 
considers whether the impact of the official action “ ‘bears 
more heavily on one race than another.’ ”225  In the racial 
context, if the official action burdens one race considerably 
more than another, this alone can establish intent.226  Even if 
by comparison, the burden is not quite that extreme, this 
element, in conjunction with others, can still suggest intent to 
discriminate against a race.227  When ascertaining 
discriminatory effect in the racial context, courts have often 
relied on statistical evidence228 and expert testimony.229 
 
 220. See generally Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977). 
 221. Any time lines are drawn, it is bound to mean one group will constitute 
a majority more often than other groups. 
 222. See generally supra Part III. 
 223. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 474–75 
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 224. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–68. 
 225. Id. at 266 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). 
 226. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). 
 227. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977) 
 228. See Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2005).  For 
instance, the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana once found 
intent to gerrymander districts based on race when it noted that one district 
gathered a disproportionate number of black voters and excluded a 
disproportionate number of white voters.  See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 
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In the partisan gerrymandering context, courts would be 
more than able to rely upon both statistical evidence and 
expert testimony when ascertaining impact.  If the suit is 
brought after an election using the new district maps, a court 
could examine the new seat allocations of each party.230  In 
Vieth, Democrats were the majority, but the redistricting plan 
passed by the legislature created Republican majorities in 
sixty-eight percent of the state congressional districts.231  In 
LULAC, the middecennial redistricting increased the 
Republican representation in the legislature from forty-seven 
to sixty-nine percent.232  Other types of statistical evidence 
would work too.  In Larios, while the redistricting plan 
protected Democrat incumbents, Republicans were paired so 
that fifty percent of the Republican caucus in the house would 
be running against one another.233  And of course, just like in 
the racial context, expert testimony can also be useful.234  
District courts could simply have experts look at the partisan 
make-up of the proposed districts, and analyze whether or not 
they were drawn so as to harm one party.  Therefore, courts 
should be able to use this test to ascertain disproportionate 
impact, and thus evidence of intent. 
The second aspect of the Arlington Heights test focuses 
on the historical background of the decision.  If it reveals a 
series of actions taken for invidious purposes, then the official 
action was likely taken with the intent to harm.235  A court 
 
360, 368 (W.D. La. 1996). 
 229. See Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 920 (8th Cir. 1986).  In 
Wilmington, the expert presented proof of discrimination against African 
Americans by highlighting that while African Americans made up 4.5% of the 
workforce, they accounted for 43% of those discharged.  Id. 
 230. For instance, if a party received roughly the same proportion of the total 
vote that it received in the previous election, but this time only won a fraction of 
the seats, this would demonstrate disproportionate impact. 
 231. McDonald, supra note 28, at 254. 
 232. Id. at 257. 
 233. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, Cox v. 
Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 234. See Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 655–59 (N.D. Ill. 
1991). 
 235. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
267 (1977).  In one racial equal protection case, the Court used several historical 
studies and testimony of two expert historians to determine that a provision of 
the Alabama constitution was enacted for the purpose of disenfranchising 
African Americans because it was ratified at the end of reconstruction when a 
zeal for white supremacy ran rampant throughout the constitutional convention 
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could examine the history surrounding the redistricting 
decision to determine what the drive behind the selection 
was.  For instance, in LULAC, the legislature decided to 
redistrict following a democratic gerrymander a few years 
before.236  Courts could use experts to determine if districts 
were historically drawn to dilute a party’s influence.237  
Though it would likely not be dispositive, this could provide 
evidence that a legislature intended to dilute the opposing 
party’s influence. 
Third, the racial gerrymandering cases investigate the 
sequence of events leading up to the decision.238  Similar 
evidence could be used in partisan gerrymandering.  In 
LULAC, the redistricting followed a Republican takeover.239  
In Vieth, the redistricting plan was pushed after national 
figures suggested the Pennsylvania State Legislature take 
such action for revenge against Democrats for making similar 
moves elsewhere.240  In Larios, the redistricting by Democrats 
came as the Republican electorate began to grow.241  The 
courts could use this as evidence that the legislature was 
more concerned with harming the opposition’s vote than 
adherence to nonpartisan motives. 
The Arlington Heights test also allows courts to focus on 
departures from normal procedural sequences, such as 
sudden changes in voting procedures or mechanisms, as 
evidence of racially discriminatory intent.242  This would also 
 
and the state.  See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985). 
 236. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410–11 
(2006). 
 237. In the racial gerrymandering context, a district court found a historical 
invidious districting scheme when it noted that, while the Hispanic population 
had grown in the most heavily populated Hispanic district in Los Angeles 
between 1959 and 1971, no Los Angeles redistricting scheme had created a 
supervisorial district in which Hispanic persons were a majority of the 
population.  See Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (C.D. Cal. 
1990). 
 238. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.  For example, a court 
once found the fact that a city re-zoning and declaring a development 
moratorium shortly after learning of plans for a low-income housing complex to 
be evidence of discriminatory intent.  See Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of 
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 109, 115 (2d. Cir. 1970). 
 239. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 413. 
 240. McDonald, supra note 28, at 253–54. 
 241. Id. at 259. 
 242. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 144–45 (3d Cir. 
1977) (finding evidence of racial animus when a city council changed the 
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be applicable in partisan gerrymandering claims.  For 
instance, in LULAC, the Texas State Legislature decided to 
redistrict middecade.243  Because mandatory redistricting 
occurs once a decade with every new census,244 this is 
evidence that partisan harm was the motivation behind a 
redistricting scheme. 
Departures from substantive norms have also been used 
as evidence of invidious intent.245  In a partisan 
gerrymandering case, the court could examine similar 
departures.  For instance, in all three of the modern partisan 
gerrymandering cases, there were accusations that the 
legislatures completely disregarded the traditional 
redistricting criteria.246  Such maneuvers could be strong 
evidence of partisan bias being the true motivation of a 
redistricting move, as it would rule out other possible 
motivations for a decision to redistrict. 
The Arlington Heights test also uses the legislative 
history behind an official action to determine if invidious 
discrimination was the motivation behind a bill.247  Such 
evidence exists in the partisan gerrymandering context as 
well.  Often, politicians will explicitly state what their 
 
procedure it followed when voting on a bill). 
 243. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 413. 
 244. Id. at 420; Strength in Numbers, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/StrengthInNumbers2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 
29, 2013); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 3; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–
69 (1964). 
 245. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.  In a racial setting, evidence 
of racial animus was found in the fact that a city refused to re-zone a low-
income housing site to a multifamily zone, despite the fact that the entire 
surrounding area was zoned for multifamily residences.  See Dailey v. City of 
Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 1970).  Further, in Hays v. Louisiana, 
court noted that the district in question was 250 miles long, cut across fifteen 
parishes while only containing three whole parishes, and linked divergently 
differing communities with unique cultures, identities, histories, economies, and 
religions.  Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 368 (W.D. La. 1996). 
 246. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 
399 (2006); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004). 
 247. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 
(1977).  For instance, officials’ knowledge of the disproportionate impact the 
action would have on a group, while not being dispositive of the intent behind 
the action, was considered to be pertinent evidence.  See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283 (1979). 
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motives are.248  For instance, the redistricting measure 
challenged in Vieth was openly pushed as a means to counter 
other partisan gerrymanders favorable to Democrats.249  
Courts could use such blanket statements as strong evidence 
that there was intent to harm. 
Naturally, this list of factors would not be exhaustive, 
and not every piece of the Arlington Heights test could be 
applied to the partisan gerrymandering standard.250  Courts 
could still use these elements, in addition to any other 
relevant factors,251 to help ascertain whether or not a 
legislature acted with the intent to dilute the influence of the 
opposing political party when it decided to redistrict. 
There is one other crucial factor to the Arlington Heights 
test that should be applied to the partisan gerrymandering 
standard.  A defendant should be given the opportunity to 
demonstrate the plan would have been adopted anyway, even 
if there was intent to harm.252  If the defendants could show 
that there is no preferable districting scheme, or no 
alternative scheme that adheres more closely to traditional 
redistricting criteria, a court cannot fairly say a legislature 
acted with bad intent. 
C. The Altered Gingles Test 
Now that the extra intent standard has been analyzed, it 
is important to explain how the Gingles test would evolve in 
 
 248. See McDonald, supra note 28, at 254. 
 249. See id. 
 250. For instance, many of the racial discrimination cases will use racial or 
derogatory comments by officials as evidence of discriminatory intent.  Mullen 
v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 1130, 1133 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(holding evidence that members of a fire company used racial slurs was relevant 
in lawsuit alleging discriminatory hiring practices).  But political discourse is 
usually heated.  Derogatory comments about the opposing party would not be 
very strong evidence of discriminatory intent. 
 251. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of factors, just as it is not 
meant to be exhaustive in the realm of ascertaining racially discriminatory 
intent either.  Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 ("The foregoing 
summary identifies, without purporting to be exhaustive, subjects of proper 
inquiry In determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed.").   
 252. For instance, in Webb v. City of Chester, the Seventh Circuit said it was 
not only relevant that the plaintiff’s performance as a policeman could have 
been the true, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge, but also that 
excluding the evidence would have been an abuse of discretion.  Webb v. City of 
Chester, 813 F.2d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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the partisan gerrymandering context.  The first factor 
requires a racial group to prove it is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact.253  The second and third prongs of the 
Gingles test requires a plaintiff to show whether the 
disadvantaged race votes as a cohesive group,254 and whether 
the advantaged race votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the 
disadvantaged race’s candidate.255  These two factors are 
often analyzed together to see whether the races vote as a 
bloc,256 and these same factors could be utilized in the 
partisan gerrymandering context.257 
The first prong of this test should be easy to satisfy.  In 
the racial context, courts often engage in a two-pronged 
analysis, by first looking at the population of a minority 
group, and then its compactness.258  Courts will typically 
assess the size of population via the minority group’s voting 
age population;259 if plaintiffs are split into multiple districts 
when they could be the majority in one, or if they are being 
packed into one district when they could be the majority in 
two, a Section Two claim may exist.260  When assessing 
compactness, courts often examine the district’s shape to see 
if it conforms to traditional redistricting principles, including 
 
 253. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
 254. Id. at 51. 
 255. Id. 
 256. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 165. 
 257. For purposes of Voting Rights Act analysis, there used to be a dispute as 
to the significance of meeting these three factors.  Some courts held the three 
factors established a voting dilution claim while others held that these three 
factors were a threshold requirement that must be met before the courts 
engaged in a totality-of-the-circumstances test.  Gomeza v. City of Watsonville, 
863 F.2d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[F]actors other than the three elements 
discussed above, while supportive of a Section 2 violation, are not essential to a 
minority voter's claim.”); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F. 2d 937, 942 
(7th Cir. 1987) (referring to the factors as a threshold for surviving summary 
judgment before the court engages in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis).  
The Supreme Court answered the question by stating that these factors are a 
requisite to show a Voting Rights Claim, but courts must also examine the 
totality of the circumstances to see if impermissible racial vote dilution is 
occurring.  Johnson v. De Grangy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994).  For the 
purposes of the proposed partisan gerrymandering test, these factors will be 
sufficient to show effect.  See supra Part IV.B.   
 258. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial 
Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 643, 661 (2006). 
 259. See Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 260. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 161. 
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whether or not it captures a particular community.261  If the 
district fails to capture a community, yet there is a single 
minority community, then there is a racial gerrymandering 
issue.262  Courts could do the same thing with partisan 
gerrymandering by looking at data to determine if a political 
party lives in a sufficiently large and geographically compact 
area.263  With this, courts could determine whether or not a 
political group is sufficiently compact.  If a political group is 
so spread out that no district adhering to traditional criteria 
could be drawn so they are the majority, then it would not be 
fair to find an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.  The 
key question is whether or not the group is sufficiently 
compact to form the majority in a traditional district.264 
The second and third prongs of the test are more 
complicated, but these are crucial steps in ascertaining 
effect.265  The most obvious way a court determines whether 
bloc voting is occurring is by finding a political race where a 
minority candidate is running and assuming he is the 
candidate of choice for minorities.266  This type of analysis 
would be unhelpful in a partisan gerrymandering context.  
People do not always prefer the candidate of their party, as 
evidenced by the fact that even Barack Obama won nine 
percent of the Republican vote in 2008.267  Further, ideologies 
vary considerably within political parties,268 so it is important 
that courts consider how people within parties are actually 
voting, or are actually going to vote, before concluding that 
bloc voting is occurring. 
 
 
 261. See Katz et al., supra note 258, at 662–63. 
 262. See id. 
 263. As mentioned earlier, this data is readily available.  See Report of 
Registration, supra note 126. 
 264. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 (1986). 
 265. See Katz et al., supra note 258, at 663–64. 
 266. See id. at 665–66.  For instance, in Barrett v. City of Chicago, the court 
assumed that African Americans would want to elect the African American 
candidate for alderman, and when they could not, the court assumed racial bloc 
voting was occurring.  See Barnett v. City of Chi., 141 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
 267. Inside Obama's Sweeping Victory, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/11/05/inside-obamas-sweeping-victory/.  
 268. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Political Ideology Stable with Conservatives 
Leading, GALLUP (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148745/Political-
Ideology-Stable-Conservatives-Leading.aspx. 
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However, other methods that courts use for determining 
racial bloc voting would be more helpful.  Courts in the Ninth, 
Sixth, and Second Circuits look to election results to 
determine if bloc voting is occurring.269  If a court finds that a 
racial group consistently supports candidates of that race, 
and those candidates consistently lose, this suggests bloc 
voting.270  This could be used in a partisan gerrymandering 
test, by utilizing exit polls to determine if people vote for their 
party. 
Some courts demand extra evidence to determine a 
group’s candidate of choice.271  Courts have required plaintiffs 
to show the depth and vigor of minority support and the scope 
of the candidate’s interest in the minority community on top 
of showing that the minority votes for the candidate.272  Here, 
a court could use exit poll information to determine how party 
members voted, and could examine how much excitement 
surrounded the campaign.273  Courts could also review the 
candidate’s ideology and the parties’ platforms, to test 
whether the candidate’s ideology was both in line with 
members of his party and opposed by members of the 
opposing party.274 
Of course, whichever system courts choose to employ, 
certain elections should be excluded from the analysis 
because of the risk of having anomalous results.  Plurality 
victories, elections where lots of uncertainty surround 
procedural issues, elections where candidates run unopposed, 
elections where a major party candidate only runs against a 
third party candidate, and any election where a candidate is 
the subject of a criminal investigation, is a celebrity, or is 
virtually unknown, are not considered when determining 
 
 269. See Katz et al., supra note 258, at 667. 
 270. See Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1416–17 (9th Cir. 
1988) (finding that because Hispanics always supported the Hispanic candidate 
and because that candidate was consistently defeated, bloc voting must be 
occurring). 
 271. See Katz et al., supra note 258, at 667. 
 272. Id. at 666. 
 273. In other words, if there is a hyper partisan election with very prominent 
campaigns, this could be evidence of polarized voting. 
 274. If an extremely pro-life Democrat runs, and abortion happens to be the 
hot button issue that year, Republicans might not be able to blame their loss on 
partisan gerrymandering. 
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racial bloc voting.275  These elections should be similarly 
discounted in partisan gerrymandering cases too. 
By accounting for outlier elections and utilizing the well-
polished racial gerrymandering tests, courts should be able to 
use the Gingles factors for ascertaining whether a partisan 
gerrymander had a harmful effect.  Further, by using the 
Arlington Heights test, courts should be able to ascertain 
discriminatory intent.  For instance, Michigan Democrats 
have recently accused Republicans of drawing districts to 
dilute the Democrat vote.276  Admittedly, the following facts 
were all taken from the accusations, but assuming them to be 
true, and assuming there is no rebuttal, a court could take 
the facts to demonstrate the Democrats have a viable claim.  
Michigan is a state with a close divide of Democrats and 
Republicans.277  However, in 2010, Republicans swept the 
elections, and took complete control of the government.278  
With this new control, Republicans drew the maps so two 
Democratic incumbents must run against each other while no 
Republican incumbents must do so,279 it created seven safe 
Republican seats while only creating five safe Democratic 
seats,280 and the districts split urban communities where 
Democrats are primarily located.281  These facts suggest 
intent.  First, the action bears more heavily on Democrats 
than Republicans.  Second, the sequence of events leading up 
 
 275. See, e.g., Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1048 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(discounting an election where one of the two candidates was merely a third 
party candidate); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 
1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1997) (discounting an election when determining racial bloc 
voting when a candidate ran unopposed); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 
71 F.3d 1382, 1389 (8th Cir. 1995) (discounting a plurality victory when 
determining if racial bloc voting was occurring); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 
1183, 1193 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (discounting an election where a candidate was the 
subject of an investigation); Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807, 812 (N.D. Miss. 
1984) (discounting an election where voters were unsure about the election 
date).   
 276. Mark Brewer, Testimony of Mark Brewer Regarding Congressional 
Redistricting, MICHIGAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.michigandems.com/2011BrewerRedistrictingTestimony.pdf. 
 277. Rob Richie & Jais Mehaji, Gerrymandering in Michigan and the Super 
District Remedy, FAIRVOTE (July 20, 2011), http://www.fairvote.org 
/gerrymandering-in-michigan-and-the-super-district-remedy. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See Brewer, supra note 276. 
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to redistricting suggests intent, as the maps were drawn after 
a sudden Republican takeover.  Further, the districts drawn 
do not adhere to community boundaries, and are oddly 
shaped.282  These departures from the substantive norms that 
a legislature typically adheres to when redistricting suggest 
intent.  Unless the Republicans could rebut the claims with 
legitimate, nonpartisan reasons for drawing these districts, 
the intent prong would likely be met. 
The Democrats should also be able to demonstrate effect.  
There is a fairly even split between Democrats and 
Republicans, with Democrats concentrated in urban areas, so 
Democrats are likely sufficiently large and geographically 
compact.283  Demonstrating bloc voting could be difficult.  
Because Republicans swept the 2010 elections, some 
Democrats must have voted for them then.284  However, by 
utilizing polling data and expert testimony, Democrats may 
be able to demonstrate future bloc voting.  Assuming this is 
true and not rebuttable, Michigan Democrats would be able to 
demonstrate that the Republicans have engaged in an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts are likely to revisit partisan gerrymandering 
as legislatures redistrict following the recent 2010 Census.  
Unfortunately, courts do not have any real guidance on 
whether these claims will be justiciable, or even if they are, 
how these claims should be adjudicated.  However, 
considering the very real harm partisan gerrymandering can 
cause to the power of an individual’s vote, the Supreme Court 
should consider adopting a uniform, workable standard.  By 
adopting a modified Gingles plus intent test, courts should be 
able to handle these claims effectively. 
 
 282. One district spans over fifty miles while only being a half a mile wide at 
some points, while another district is only a few blocks wide at times.  Id. 
 283. See Richie & Mehaji, supra note 277. 
 284. See id. 
